Tec*mseh A Biography of the Shawnee Chief (2024)

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Biography ofShawnee ChiefTec*mseh 1768-1813

TEc*msEH (Tech-kum-thai),Shawnee chief; his name has been said to mean shooting star or panther crouchingin wait; b. c. 1768, probably near present-day Springfield, Ohio; hisfather, who may have been named Puckeshinwa, was a Shawnee chief, and his mothermay have had some Creek blood; d.5Oct.1813 at what is nowThamesville, Ont., in the battle of Moraviantown.

During the closing decades of the 18th century, Indian lands west of theAppalachian Mountains were increasingly threatened by white colonization. Theboundary that Great Britain had tried to erect by the Quebec Act of 1774 wasshattered by the American revolution, and in the following years the Americansdemonstrated their determination to extend their settlements at Indian expense.Efforts by Little Turtle [Michikinakoua] andothers to unify the Six Nations and the various western tribes into aconfederacy met with only limited success; the Americans dealt with individualtribes or parts of tribes and absorbed more and more land. Indian resistance toAmerican expansion resulted in three major battles over the Ohio country duringthe 1790s. Many authorities claim that Tec*mseh participated in all of them, butit appears that he was absent from the first. In the second, the defeat in 1791of an American force near the Miamis Towns (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Tec*mseh servedas a scout with the warriors of the confederacy. In the third, the battle ofFallen Timbers (near Waterville, Ohio) in August1794, he headed a smallparty of Shawnees and distinguished himself when other warriors were retreatingby charging a group of Americans who had a field piece, cutting loose thehorses, and riding off. Although Indian and American casualties were about thesame in this battle, the Indians lost their hope of assistance from the Britishwho, after apparent promises of aid, even refused them shelter in Fort Miamis(Maumee) following the battle. At the Treaty of Greenville in August1795,the Indians gave up most of present-day Ohio and made other smaller cessions aswell. They became caught in a vicious spiral. Scarcity of game and fur-bearinganimals meant that to survive they were forced to sell more land to the whitesand in so doing they grew even more dependent on them.Between 1803 and1805 at least 30 million acres were relinquished. Moreover the Americaninsistence on peace both with and among the various tribes weakened thefoundations of the Indians’ warrior society.

For a few years after Fallen Timbers Tec*mseh lived as a band chief at severallocations near present-day Piqua, Ohio. He and his band then moved to the westfork of the White River (Ind.). In 1799 he took part in a council near what isnow Urbana, Ohio, to smooth out differences between the races, presenting aspeech of such “force and eloquence” that the interpreter had troubletranslating it. At Chillicothe, Ohio, in 1803 he repeated assurances of peaceafter the murder of a settler. Two years later, Tec*mseh and his band located atGreenville on the urgings of his brother the Prophet [Tenskwatawa*], who hadbeen instructed by the Great Spirit to set up his headquarters there.

The millenarian religion preached by the Prophet was not unique. Throughout theworld such movements have promised supernatural aid to native peoples faced withthe realization that their way of life cannot be retained by physical strengthalone. Like the leaders of the Delaware nativist revival in the 1750s and 1760sand the prophet of the ghost-dance religion on the prairies in the late 19thcentury, he predicted that divine intervention would save the Indians from theirwhite oppressors. He taught that their present suffering was a chastisem*nt. Ifthey would purge themselves of white influence, stop practising witchcraft, andreturn to a purified Indian religion, the Great Spirit would see them livehappily as before. There was also a thinly veiled hint that they would bedelivered from the Americans, who “grew from the Scum of the great Water whenit was troubled by the Evil Spirit.” “They are unjust,” the Great Spirithad told him, “they have taken away your Lands which were not made forthem.” Stories of the Prophet’s revelations and commandments were soon incirculation all over the country south of the Great Lakes, along with accountsof his miracles. Some Delawares went so far in their fervour that they executedopponents of the movement. Whites at posts as distant as Michilimackinac (MackinacIsland, Mich.) complained of his influence.

There is no evidence that Tec*mseh was involved in the evolution of thisreligion, but as Pontiac* had harnessed the energies of the Delaware revival, soTec*mseh transformed the Prophet’s religion into a movement dedicated toretaining Indian land. By the spring of 1807 he revealed a new firmness towardsthe Americans. When agent William Wells asked him to come to Fort Wayne fortalks, Tec*mseh replied: “The Great Spirit above has appointed this place forus, on which to light our fires, and here we will remain. As to boundaries, theGreat Spirit above knows no boundaries, nor will his red people acknowledgeany.”

Americans thought they detected the hand of Great Britain in the Indians’activities. Governor William Henry Harrison of Ohio called the Prophet a“fool, who speaks not the words of the Great Spirit but those of the devil,and of the British agents.” He was unhappy that the Indians were still in thehabit of calling on British posts to trade and to receive gifts from the king.He was also justly suspicious of the activities of Canadian-based traders whocame gathering intelligence as well as furs. Indeed the governor-in-chief, SirJamesHenry Craig, and lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Francis Gore*, had setabout revitalizing the Indian Department and recruiting Indian allies in theperiod of tension following the Chesapeake affair of 1807 [see SirGeorgeCranfield Berkeley]. In Craig’s view, “if we do not employ them, therecannot exist a moment’s doubt that they will be employed against us. ...”Authorities sought out a few Indians who they thought could be trusted with theconfidential information that war with the United States might not be far off.In return for support in such an event they were promised aid during thefighting and the eventual return of at least some of their lands. Apparentlyunaware of Tec*mseh’s existence, the British were intrigued by stories of theProphet. Craig suggested that his influence be purchased “at what might be ahigh price upon any other occasion.”

Attempts in 1808 to bring the Prophet to Fort Malden (Amherstburg), UpperCanada, failed because of enmity between him and the Shawnee chiefs visitingthere and because he had been instructed by the Great Spirit to move toTippecanoe (near Lafayette, Ind.). In June the unknown Tec*mseh appeared in hisplace. Gore, who visited the fort in July, met Tec*mseh and in a report to Craigcalled him “a very shrewd intelligent man.” The Shawnee chief had toldIndian Department officials William Claus* and Matthew Elliottthat he and the Prophet were attempting to gather all the tribes into onesettlement to defend their lands. They had no intention at the moment of takingpart in a war between Britain and the United States, although he added that“if their father the King should be in earnest and appear in sufficient forcethey would hold fast by him.” But though Tec*mseh had made an impression, hewas to be referred to for some time in British correspondence as the “Brotherof the Prophet.”

In the spring of 1809 Tec*mseh began a journey to the Senecas and Wyandots inthe neighbourhood of Sandusky (Ohio) and to the Six Nations Indians in New YorkState to spread the message of unification against encroachment and to argue thecase for common ownership of all Indian land. At Sandusky opposition from Tarhe(Crane), a Wyandot signatory to the Treaty of Greenville, prevented any move byIndians there. On his trip to the Six Nations, Tec*mseh had with him astranslator Caleb Atwater. According to Atwater, Tec*mseh said he “had visitedthe Florida Indians, and even the Indians so far to the north that snow coveredthe ground in midsummer.” It is not clear if the statements were intendedliterally. This visit also brought no immediate results. Support for theconfederacy continued to come from the tribes south of the Great Lakes and northof the Ohio River. It was strongest among the Potawatomis, Ojibwas, Shawnees,Ottawas, Winnebagos, and Kickapoos, but it could also be found among theDelawares, Wyandots, Menominees, Miamis, Piankeshaws, and others. It tended tocome from young warriors, whereas older chiefs were more likely to be opposed,not the least of their reasons being the fact that the confederacy underminedtheir authority within their respective tribes. Blue Jacket [Weyapiersenwah] wasone of the few older chiefs who remained consistently hostile to the Americans.All sorts of circ*mstances caused favour for the movement to ebb and flow. Thedegree of support among a tribe was probably linked to the level of frustrationits people felt in their efforts to fend off the American advance and maintainan Indian way of life. On the other hand, some of the most militant adherentswere drawn from tribes that had never considered themselves really defeated inprevious clashes with the whites, whether French, British, or American. Theeffect of British agitation must also have been a factor in determining theamount of sympathy with which a group regarded the movement.

The confederacy was threatened with a loss of support later in 1809 whenGovernor Harrison, judging the organization, weak enough to be ignored,purchased another large tract from individual tribes. Tec*mseh and the Prophethad promised to stop such transactions, and if they did nothing the movementwould appear impotent. Direct action, however, would mean heavy loss of Indianlife and withdrawal of British favour. Tec*mseh responded therefore bypreventing survey of the cession and by threatening death to those chiefs whohad signed the treaty if the land were not returned. Tensions ran high, and inAugust1810 Tec*mseh went to Vincennes to meet with Harrison. He repeatedthe aims of the confederacy: the unification of the tribes and the establishmentof the principle of common ownership of the land so that none of it could besold without the consent of all Indians. He added that the village chiefs wouldbe stripped of their powers and authority put into the hands of the warriors.The meeting solved nothing, and as fall approached war remained a distinctpossibility.

In November Tec*mseh was at Fort Malden where he suggested, to Elliott’sastonishment, that he was ready to go to war with the Americans. Elliott repliedthat he would lay the matter before the king; in fact, he wrote to Clausurgently requesting direction. His letter passed up the ladder to Craig, whosemain concern was not setting a new policy but avoiding American retribution forhis previous belligerent one. He instructed the British chargé d’affaires inWashington to warn the Americans that the Indians might attack. In February1811,long after the Indians had gone to their hunting and sugaring grounds, he wroteto Gore ordering him to keep them peaceful by whatever means were available,including denial of arms and ammunition to those who appeared bellicose.

Tension between the Indians and the Americans continued to grow. Late in JulyTec*mseh, accompanied by some 300 Indians, arrived at Vincennes for talks withHarrison. Again nothing was solved, and on leaving Tec*mseh told Harrison he wasgoing to the south to spread the message of common ownership and unification tothe Indians there. In anticipation of his absence Harrison began to plan a marchon Tippecanoe in hopes of goading the Prophet to some rash, hostile act thatwould justify extermination or removal of his followers. When fighting did takeplace, on the morning of 7November, casualties on both sides were aboutthe same. The Indians ran out of ammunition and fled, their faith in the Prophetshaken, and the Americans looted and burned their village. Harrison mistakenlyequated their disillusionment with the death of the movement. However, therelative strength of their resistance had shown the Indians that they did nothave to rely on the supernatural alone to oppose the Americans. The sense ofinvincibility was perhaps gone, but a new determination to fight had been born.

When Tec*mseh returned to Tippecanoe, he found “great destruction and havoc–the fruits of our labour destroyed,” the bodies of his friends lying in thedust, and his village in ashes. He began to rebuild his following and preparefor the eventual fight. By June1812 it was clear that the confederacy wasat least as strong as before Tippecanoe. Unaware that war between Britain andthe United States had already been declared, Tec*mseh boldly announced at FortWayne on 18June that he was on his way to Fort Malden for lead and powder.Though he was warned by the Americans that his trip would be considered “anact of enmity,” no other attempt was made to stop him.

The extent of Tec*mseh’s authority over the Indians who would fight alongsidethe British in the war is not easily defined. John Mackay Hitsman contends thathe was “merely the most forceful of several tribal chiefs,” and certainlythere were other prominent leaders present on the Detroit frontier, Roundhead [Stayeghtha],Myeerah, Thomas Splitlog [To-oo-troon-to-ra*],and Billy Caldwell* among them.The evidence suggests, however, that theonly person who rivalled Tec*mseh in his ability to marshal Indian support forthe war effort was Robert Dickson*, a Scottish trader from the upper Mississippivalley. Matthew Elliott reported: “Tech-kum-thai has kept ... [theIndians] faithful– he has shewn himself to be a determined character anda great friend to our Government.” It should not be thought, however, thatTec*mseh had any sort of absolute control over the Indians who had followed himinto Upper Canada. What authority he had had before the war was badly damaged bytheir loss of faith in the Prophet’s teachings. But no Indian leader had everbeen able to dictate to the warriors. White officers had that kind of authoritybecause white societies were able to carry on despite huge losses in battle. TheIndians could not sustain such losses; the continued existence of a tribedepended on its having enough young men to hunt and fight, and it was left tothe individual warrior to make the decision about his own survival in war. Whiteofficers found the practice made Indians unreliable, in their terms, and theystrongly disapproved. Nor did they ever come to understand the Indian habit ofdeciding to fight or not to fight on the basis of omens and visions and dreams.The fact that some Indians were not above using visions to extort specialfavours from their allies made relations worse. Tec*mseh was different. There isno record of his having used such tactics with the British, and they likedworking with him because he seemed to understand military operations as if hewere a trained soldier.

The first official word of Tec*mseh’s presence in Upper Canada after theoutbreak of the war came on 8July: he was reported to have played “aconspicuous part” in a council at Sandwich (Windsor) the day before. On 13Julythe American forces under Brigadier-GeneralWilliam Hull, governor of theMichigan Territory, seized that village. Then, encouraged by desertions amongthe Upper Canadian militia and the apparent neutrality of Indians he hadexpected to support the British, Hull began to send detachments farther into theprovince. He was fearful, however, that Indians might cut his lines of supply,which ran south by land to Ohio, and indeed on 5August one of hisprovision trains was ambushed in the neighbourhood of Brownstown (near Trenton,Mich.) by Tec*mseh and some others. This action, combined with the news that theBritish had captured Fort Michilimackinac [see Charles Roberts]and were advancing from the Niagara frontier, prompted Hull’s withdrawal ofmost of his forces from Canadian territory on 8August. The next dayTec*mseh and Roundhead led the Indians who joined some regulars and militia in abloody skirmish south of Detroit at Maguaga (Wyandotte) with an American forcesent out to protect another supply train. Isaac Brock,the British commander in Upper Canada, reached Fort Malden with reinforcementson 13August and immediately formulated a bold plan for an attack onDetroit. Tec*mseh was delighted, since the Indians, about 600 in number, hadbeen fretting at British caution. On 16August Brock advanced on the fort,having threatened Hull that “the numerous body of Indians who have attachedthemselves to my troops, will be beyond controul the moment the contestcommences.” The American commander surrendered without a fight. Legend has itthat Tec*mseh rode beside Brock when he entered Detroit and that Brock gave himhis sash as a mark of respect. Whatever the case may be, there is no doubt ofBrock’s esteem for him. “A more sagacious or a more gallant Warrior does notI believe exist,” the commander wrote. Moreover, Brock became convinced thatan Indian state south of the Great Lakes should be created.

In the early weeks of the war many Indians stood aside from the fighting,remembering broken promises of British aid and feeling the odds against theconfederacy too great. The successes of the British at Detroit andMichilimackinac, however, created the impression that they were willing and ableto take American territory in this war, and the Potawatomi capture of thegarrison from Fort Dearborn (Chicago) on 15August gave the Indians a newself-confidence. Hundreds of them abandoned their neutrality. By the autumn of1812 Tec*mseh had about a thousand warriors with him.

Tec*mseh’s whereabouts during the winter of 1812–13 are not clear. Someauthorities claim he travelled south again, but the sole notice in primarysources says simply that he was ill for part of the season. When spring came,the British began an offensive out of Fort Malden into the country south of LakeErie. In April Tec*mseh and Roundhead led about 1,200 Indians who joined withsome 900 regulars and militia under Major-GeneralHenry Procter* in thesiege of Fort Meigs (near Perrysburg, Ohio). The American garrison, whichnumbered about a thousand, resisted successfully but a relief force was attackedand 500 prisoners were taken. The Indians, carried away with their triumph,began to kill them, and Procter made no effort to stop the slaughter, whichceased only with the arrival of Tec*mseh. Indeed, Tec*mseh’s humanity on thisoccasion was long remembered and it contributed to his reputation among whites.The Indians were eager to have this fort taken, and after the first siege failedTec*mseh and the others put such pressure on Procter that a second wasundertaken in July. The British committed only a few regulars to the attack,depending on the Indians, whose numbers had been augmented from a force of some1,400 that Robert Dickson brought to Fort Malden from the upper country.Tec*mseh and Matthew Elliott began by leading a scouting party eastward to checkfor approaching reinforcements. The British did not have proper siege equipmentwith them, and the Indians were apparently relying on a sham battle to draw thegarrison out of the fort; so when the trick failed, the operation was abandoned.Procter then chose Fort Stephenson (Fremont, Ohio) as a more vulnerable target,but it too resisted fiercely when besieged at the end of July. Morale among theBritish and the Indians flagged as a result of the heavy casualties sufferedthere.

The situation on the Detroit frontier worsened with the defeat of the Britishfleet under CaptainRobert Heriot Barclay* at the battle of Put-in Bay(Ohio) on 10September. Procter, with about 1,000 regulars and nearly 3,000warriors and their dependents, had no way now to obtain sufficient provisions,and he knew that the Americans under William Henry Harrison were preparing aninvasion. Without consulting the Indians he began dismantling Fort Malden andpreparing to retreat towards the head of Lake Ontario. Tec*mseh had longsuspected that Procter would flee without a fight and he begged him to providethe Indians with arms so that they could carry on their struggle alone. Theirgoal of retaining their homeland could hardly be achieved from the Niagarafrontier. Procter promised to make a stand at the forks of the Thames (Chatham),and some of the Indians, including Tec*mseh, agreed to make the retreat.Tec*mseh repeatedly urged Procter to stop and face the enemy, but even when thepromised location for a fight was reached Procter continued on ahead of the mainforce, looking for a more defensible site. A number of Indians, believing nostand would be taken, left in disgust. Tec*mseh was apparently infuriated by thegeneral’s behaviour but was unable to find him.

Finally, on 5October, Procter met the Americans, in the battle ofMoraviantown, not far from the village that missionary David Zeisbergerhad founded in 1792 for converts fleeing the disorder on the Americanfrontier. The British formed their lines with the Indians stationed in swampyground on the right. The troops were so demoralized that at the first Americanattack they broke and ran. Their flight left about 500 Indians to face some3,000 Americans. During this futile resistance Tec*mseh was fatally wounded. Tothis day neither the identity of his slayer nor what his comrades did with hisremains is known. With his death, effective Indian resistance south of the lakespractically ceased. Little more than a week later some of the tribes representedat the battle signed a truce with the Americans. Various efforts by the Britishto re-enlist them failed. By July1814, months before the end of the war,Harrison met with more than 3,000 Indians to outline his conditions for peace.Neither those talks nor the Treaty of Spring Wells (1815) demanded new landcessions. By 1817, however, the Americans had returned to their old policy. Inthat year, except for a few left on small reserves, the Indians were removedfrom Ohio. By 1821 the native inhabitants of Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan hadmet the same fate. A small number of the displaced came to Upper Canada but mostwere gradually pushed westward. Of Tec*mseh’s confederacy nothing remained.Ottawa chief Naywash (Neywash) pronounced its epitaph in 1814 when he said,“Since our Great Chief Tecumtha has been killed we do not listen to oneanother, we do not rise together. We hurt ourselves by it. ...”Tec*mseh’s enemy, Harrison, had described him in 1811 as “one of thoseuncommon geniuses which spring up occasionally to produce revolutions.” Therevolution had been crushed.

Tec*mseh’s struggle and death have haunted the imagination of poets in Canadauntil the present day. To George Longmore, in his “Tecumthé; a poetical tale,in three cantos” (1824), he was a tragic hero, whose flaw was that he wasswayed by “nature not reason.” John Frederick Richardson* in his poem Tec*mseh,or the warrior of the west (1828)depicted Tec*mseh in a similar manner, the personification of goodness andhumanity transformed into a savage fiend by the Americans’ murder of his(imaginary) son. In 1886 Charles Mair* published a long verse-drama, Tec*mseh,in which the Shawnee chief is again the tragic and romantic hero, and in, hisalliance with the British and his opposition to American expansionists is asymbol of the dual aims of the Canada First movement. An analogy is made inBliss Carman*’s “Tec*mseh and the eagles” (1918) with the struggle ofnations for freedom in World War I.In Don Gutteridge’s Tec*mseh(1976) the hero is a potential mediating figure between Indian and whitecultures, whose vision, like the poet’s, is to “weave a new history from ourtwin beginnings.”

Over the course of the 19th century, historians writing in Upper Canada aboutthe War of 1812 made him into one of its heroes, until he had a place in themythology alongside Brock, Laura Secord [Ingersoll*], and the Canadian militia.To historian David Thompson he was simply “that great aboriginal hero.” ToRichardson and Gilbert Auchinleck he was the noble savage, “ever merciful andmagnanimous,” of a “gallant and impetuous spirit,” eloquent, high-minded,and dignified. The fact that he died fighting while a British general retreatedbefore the invading Americans enhanced his appeal to the loyalist mind. Theworshipful approach that these tastes inspired had two serious consequences. Itencouraged the uncritical embellishment of Tec*mseh’s image with pieces ofhearsay and invention, and it discouraged consideration of his motives. Late inthe century Ernest Alexander Cruikshank* broke with the tradition and for thefirst time Tec*mseh’s war service was subjected to a scholarly analysis of therecords. Historical writers of a lesser stature have, however, perpetuated andextended the old interpretation. In 1910 Katherine B.Coutts wrote, “Ofhis great gifts he gave all in the Canadian cause.” It was and is impossibleto cast Tec*mseh as a Canadian patriot first and an Indian second. His loyaltywas never to Canada or even to the British in Canada. It was to a dream of apan-Indian movement that would secure for his people the land necessary for themto continue their way of life. The few months he spent fighting with the Britishforces were in service of that vision. In his failure and death the cynicalBritish and Canadians were only slightly less his enemies than the Americans.

HerbertC.W.Goltz

[Untilrecently it was thought that Levi Adams had written “Tecumthé; a poeticaltale, in three cantos,” which appeared in the Canadian Rev. andLiterary and Hist. Journal (Montreal), 2 (1824):391–432. Mary Lu MacDonald’s introduction to The charivari, orCanadian poetics (Ottawa, 1977), 3–10, however, establishedGeorge Longmore as its author.

The portrait of Tec*mseh most likely to be an accurate representation of him isthe one drawn in 1808 by trader Pierre LeDru. The evidence for itsauthenticity is circ*mstantial: LeDru also did a sketch of the Prophet atthis time, and his drawing bears a strong resemblance to a later painting of theProphet done from life by George Catlin. If Catlin’s Prophet and LeDru’sProphet are the same man, then there is a good chance that LeDru’sTec*mseh is also a good likeness. The sketch of Tec*mseh that appears in B.J.Lossing,The pictorial field-book of the War of1812 ... (New York, 1869), and is reproduced in James Mooney,“The ghost-dance religion and the Sioux outbreak of 1890,” SmithsonianInstitution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Annual report(Washington), 1892–93, pt.2, 1896, is a composite, the head being taken fromthe LeDru work and the shoulders from a probably unauthentic drawing by anunknown artist.h.c.w.g.]

Fort Maiden National Hist. Park Arch. (Amherstburg, Ont.), Information files,Tec*mseh. National Arch. (Washington), RG 75, M15. PAC, MG 11, [CO 42] Q, 114:74–82; MG 19, A3; F1; F2; RG 8, I (C ser.), 257: 211, 217; 678: 267; 682: 101;RG 9, I, B1; B3; RG 10, A1; A2; A6. PRO, CO 42/89, 42/146–52, 42/160, 42/165;FO 5/48, 5/61–62, 5/77, 5/84, 5/87, 5/92, 5/112. Wis., State Hist. Soc.,Draper mss, ser.YY.Anthony Wayne... the Wayne–Knox–Pickering–McHenry correspondence,ed. R.C.Knopf (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1960; repr. Westport, Conn., 1975). Corr.of Hon. Peter Russell (Cruikshank and Hunter). Corr.of Lieut.Governor Simcoe (Cruikshank). Diplomaticcorrespondence of the United States: Canadianrelations, 1784–1860, comp. W.R.Manning with M.A.Gillis(4v., Washington, 1940–45), 1. Documents relating to theinvasion of Canada and the surrender ofDetroit, 1812, ed. E.A.Cruikshank (Ottawa, 1912). FortWayne, gateway of the west, 1802–1813:garrison orderly books, Indian agency accountbook, ed. and intro. B.J.Griswold (Indianapolis, Ind., 1927;repr. New York, 1973). George Rogers Clark papers ...[1771–84], ed. J.A.James (2v.,Springfield, Ill., 1912–26). J.[E.G.]Heckewelder, Narrativeof the mission of the United Brethrenamong the Delaware and Mohegan Indians,from its commencement, in the year 1740,to the close of the year 1808 ...(Philadelphia, 1820; repr. [New York], 1971).William Hull, Memoirs of the campaign of thenorth western army of the United States,A.D. 1812, in a series of lettersaddressed to the citizens of the UnitedStates ... (Boston, 1824). J.D.Hunter,Manners and customs of several Indian tribeslocated west of the Mississippi ...(Philadelphia, 1823; repr. Minneapolis, Minn., 1957).

Indian affairs: laws andtreaties, comp. C.J.Kappler ([2nd ed.], 2v., Washington,1904). John Johnston, “Recollections of sixty years,” ed. C.R.Conover,in L.U.Hill, John Johnston and the Indiansin the land of the Three Miamis... (Piqua, Ohio, 1957), 147–92. Letterbook of the Indian agency at FortWayne, 1809–1815, ed. Gayle Thornbrough (Indianapolis, 1961). Thelife and correspondence of Major-GeneralSirIsaacBrock, K.B., ed. F.B.Tupper (2nd ed., London,1847). Richard M’Nemar, The Kentucky revival; or, ashort history of ... Shakerism ...(New York, 1846; repr. 1974). [Ma-ka-tai-me-she-kia-kiak], Black Hawk,an autobiography, ed. Donald Jackson (Urbana, Ill., 1964).Humphrey Marshall, The history of Kentucky ...(2nd ed., 2v., Frankfort, Ky., 1824). Memoirsand correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh, secondMarquess of Londonderry, ed. C.[W.Stewart] Vane(12v. in 3 ser., London, 1848–53). Messages and letters ofWilliam Henry Harrison, ed. Logan Esarey (2v.,Indianapolis, 1922). Mich. Pioneer Coll. The newAmerican state papers [1789–1860], Indian affairs,ed. T.C.Cochran (13v., Wilmington, Del., 1972). Outpost onthe Wabash, 1787–1791; letters of Brigadier-GeneralJosiahHarmar and MajorJohn Francis Hamtramck..., ed. Gayle Thornbrough (Indianapolis, 1957). [JohnRichardson], Richardson’s War of 1812; withnotes and a life of the author,ed. A.C.Casselman (Toronto, 1902; repr. 1974); War of 1812... ([Brockville, Ont.], 1842). TheSt.Clair papers ..., ed. W.H.Smith(2v., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1882). Select British docs. ofWar of 1812 (Wood). Tec*mseh: fact andfiction in early records, ed. C.F.Klinck(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961). The territorial papers ofthe United States, comp. C.E.Carter and J.P.Bloom(28v. to date, Washington, 1934– ; repr. vols.1–26 in 25v., New York,1973). U.S., Congress, American state papers (Lowrie etal.), classII, vols.[1–2].

Kentucky Gazette (Lexington, Ky.),1807–12. National Intelligencer (Washington), 1807–12. QuebecGazette, 1807–12. Western Sun (Vincennes, [Ind.]),1807–12. Caleb Atwater, A history ofthe state of Ohio, natural and civil(Cincinnati, 1838); The writings of Caleb Atwater(Columbus, Ohio, 1833). Gilbert Auchinleck, A history of thewar between Great Britain and the UnitedStates of America, during the years 1812,1813, and 1814 (Toronto, 1855). Pierre Berton, Flamesacross the border, 1813–1814 (Toronto, 1981); Theinvasion of Canada, 1812–1813 (Toronto, 1980).[These two works perpetuate the romantic and spectacular view of Tec*mseh.h.c.w.g.]H.M.Brackenridge, History of the late war,between the United States and Great Britain;containing a minute account of the variousmilitary and naval operations (4th ed., Baltimore,Md., 1818). C.W.Butterfield, History of the Girtys... (Cincinnati, 1890). G.C.Chalou, “The red pawns goto war: British-American Indian relations, 1810–1815” (phdthesis, Indiana Univ., Bloomington, 1971). Moses Dawson, A historicalnarrative of the civil and military servicesof Major-GeneralWilliam H.Harrison... (Cincinnati, 1824). J.B.Dillon, A historyof Indiana from its earliest explorationby Europeans to the close of theterritorial government, in 1856 ... (Indianapolis,1859; repr. [New York], 1971). R.C.Downes, Council fireson the upper Ohio: a narrative ofIndian affairs in the upper Ohio valleyuntil 1795 (Pittsburgh, 1940). Benjamin Drake, Life ofTec*mseh, and of his brother, the Prophet... (Cincinnati, 1841). [Still the mostreliable secondary source.h.c.w.g.]Dennis Duffy, Gardens, covenants, exiles: loyalism inthe literature of Upper Canada/Ontario(Toronto, 1982). N.W.Edwards, History of Illinois,from 1778 to 1833; and life andtimes of Ninian Edwards (Springfield, Ill., 1870;repr. New York, 1975). Edward Eggleston and Lillie Eggleston Seelye, Tec*msehand the Shawnee Prophet ... (NewYork, 1878). E.S.Ellis, The life of Tec*mseh,the Shawnee chief ... (New York, 1861).

Timothy Flint, Indian wars of the west ...(Cincinnati, 1833; repr. [New York], 1971). W.A.Galloway,Old Chillicothe: Shawnee and pioneer history;conflicts and romances in the Northwestterritory (Xenia, Ohio, 1934). H.C.W.Goltz,“Tec*mseh, the Prophet, and the rise of the Northwest Indian Confederation”(phd thesis, Univ. of Western Ont., London,1973). N.StC.Gurd, The story of Tec*mseh(Toronto, 1912). H.S.Halbert and T.S.Ball, The Creekwar of 1813 and 1814 (Chicago, 1895). W.H.Harrison,A discourse on the aborigines of theOhio valley ... (Chicago, 1883). History ofGreene County, together with historic noteson the northwest, and the state ofOhio ..., comp. R.S.Dills (Dayton, Ohio,1881). Hitsman, Incredible War of 1812. ReginaldHorsman, Expansion and American Indian policy,1783–1812 ([East Lansing, Mich.], 1967); Matthew Elliott.T.L.M’Kenney and James Hall, History of the Indiantribes of North America, with biographicalsketches and anecdotes of principal chiefs... (3v., Philadelphia, 1838–44).Leslie Monkman, A native heritage: images of theIndian in English-Canadian literature (Toronto,1981). J.M.Oskison, Tec*mseh and his times:the story of a great Indian (New York,1938). Bradford Perkins, Prologue to war: England andthe United States, 1805–1812 (Berkeley and LosAngeles, Calif., 1961; repr. 1963). E.T.Raymond, Tec*mseh: achronicle of the last great leader ofhis people (Toronto, 1915). David Thompson, History ofthe late war, between Great Britain andthe United States ... (Niagara[Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ont.], 1832; repr. [New York], 1966). Glenn Tucker, Tec*mseh:vision of glory (Indianapolis and New York, 1956).[Contains much apocryphal material.h.c.w.g.]K.B.Coutts, “Thamesville and the battle of the Thames,” OH,9 (1910): 20–25. E.A.Cruikshank, “The ‘Chesapeake’ crisis asit affected Upper Canada,” OH, 24 (1927): 281–322; “The employmentof Indians in the War of 1812,” American Hist. Assoc., Annual report(Washington), 1895: 319–35. Reginald Horsman, “American Indian policy in theold northwest, 1783–1812,” William and Mary Quarterly(Williamsburg, Va.), 3rd ser., 18 (1961): 35–53.

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